Alexei Pushkov: if we want to be an independent state, we must rely on a solid economy
Alexei Pushkov
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The Chairman of the state Duma Committee on international Affairs Alexei Pushkov (Photo: author)
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As noted in one of his interviews the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, the collapse of the USSR became a tragedy for millions of people. In conversation with the correspondent of magazine “Historian” Chairman of the state Duma Committee on international Affairs Alexei Pushkov has called the main reasons for this geopolitical disaster. “Free Press” publishes the text of the interview in full, without abbreviations.
— What is the reason it began in the late 1980s, the weakening of the USSR in the international arena? With objective circumstances, or, after all, played the role of subjective factors — first of all, “Gorbachev factor”?
— Causes of major historical processes always should be sought in the combination of factors, both objective and subjective. But if you ask, was it bound to, say, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact at the intersection of 1980-90-ies, then, in my opinion, the fatal inevitability of such a development did not exist. This does not mean that the conditions are not ripe, would in ten or fifteen years — they could ripen. But at that stage — in the late 1980s – a major catalyst for the collapse of the “socialist community” and the Warsaw Pact was the policy of Gorbachev.
— That is, all the same “Gorbachev factor”…
— The fact that in hard systems, and that system was the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, everything really depends on the center. And if the centre weakens, then immediately arise or intensify centrifugal tendencies in various parts of the system. This does not mean that they appear from nowhere: such trends exist and are under strict control, but they are suppressed, hidden. With the weakening of the centre, they go outside.
Yes, in some member countries of the Warsaw Pact already had a thirst for reform was the desire for a rapprochement with Western countries. But only when it became clear that a system of geopolitical bond weakens, then appeared a natural desire to overcome the Berlin wall. In this sense, the wall fell first in Moscow and then in Berlin. In the end, everything went off the rails. Just a few months the process took a precipitous character, that enabled the West to talk about a long overdue wish of Eastern Europe out of the sphere of influence of the USSR.
— All who lived then, remember what a high degree of tension was in the relationship between the USSR and the United States the early 1980s: the townsfolk were waiting for a Third World war, and the political elites of the two countries initiated a large-scale arms race. Against this background, Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was viewed very positively here and there…
Then everyone realized that they had to flee from confrontation during the cold war. This is welcomed and in the USA, and in Australia, and in the Soviet Union, and in Hungary, and in France. Who wants to be hostage to a possible nuclear war? But how to escape from violent and dangerous confrontation, he had to go to all the American terms?! And retreat for all positions, even ahead of the wishes of the United States?
Eyewitnesses will tell you, as during the negotiations on German unification, the U.S. Secretary of state James Baker wondered, when Gorbachev and Shevardnadzedid not push him counter claims and even wishes, acting “with friends are not traded”. Neither Baker nor President BushSr. didn’t really believe it — so it was incredible. The tension should have been lower, but at such a price! Because the United States did not disband NATO and have not delivered, as we, their nuclear capabilities under control of the recent enemy. And did not allow the Russian to the Commission at its nuclear facilities.
— Where, in your opinion, the point of no return? When they began to take positions?
— Abroad — Malta: meeting Gorbachev and Bush at Malta in December 1989. There was a final turning point: Gorbachev decided not just to normalize relations and reduce the degree of confrontation with the West. Gorbachev decided to establish peace between capitalism and socialism, not realizing that such a world could not be. In the end, lost to the socialist system, which at that time was headed by Gorbachev.
He went further and reduce the tension that was absolutely justified and all caused support, switched to unilateral political, and then military-political disarmament. From that moment he became a hero for the West.
— In your opinion, is a mistake of Gorbachev or, as they say in such cases, something more than a mistake?
— There are different versions: some say bug, others say — conscious line, and agreed with the Western powers. In my opinion, Gorbachev simply did not understand the difference between one and the other. He even often did not understand what he was doing. I think he didn’t mean for that to happen such a fundamental collapse. Gorbachev — the intuitionist in politics. He received a serious education in the field of international relations or in Economics. He didn’t know how international politics and did not understand that if Thatcher him in the eye, smiles and says compliments, she fifteen thoughts behind these compliments and smiles. It all assurances and promises were taken at face value.
Gorbachev believed that the Soviet system will continue to exist, but in terms of sympathetic attitude towards her from the West. The West was another challenge — not to save the Soviet system, and get rid of it. Therefore, it is not error or random decision. This was the result of complete misunderstanding of the logic of international relations in General and the logic of American foreign policy in particular.
— Do you think that the role of Gorbachev and Yeltsin in the collapse of the Soviet Union the same?
Gorbachev, though, and tried to save the USSR, speaking for the new Union Treaty, de facto, regardless of their intentions, had prepared the conditions for the weakening of the Soviet Union as a unified state. But Yeltsin went further: unlike Gorbachev, he had consciously taken a decision to dissolve the Union. And he did it against the wishes of many leaders of the national republics who didn’t even know about the secret meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. For them, the dissolution of the USSR was a real shock: how to live in the republics, when we ceased to operate a machine that worked more than 70 years?
It was not a vicious policy, is fraught with country disintegration, as Gorbachev, and conscious course on the dismantling of the USSR. And it is significant that the first person Yeltsin has informed on liquidation of the USSR, was the President of the USA George Bush-senior. Not Gorbachev, Nazarbayev, and President Bush! Do you need another comment?
— Gorbachev that Yeltsin’s call for Bush later called “stegobium”…
— Yes. But stegobium was the reaction of Gorbachev in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha, because it was anti-constitutional coup. Yeltsin had no right thus to dissolve the Soviet Union. And if Gorbachev had a shred of courage, he being at that time President of the USSR, had to take steps to neutralize the conspirators. But he did nothing. He apparently was mentally destroyed and felt that his game is played.
— Is it possible to consider Yeltsin as the successor of the lines of Gorbachev’s foreign policy? Do they each other was considered the antagonist in all of…
— Definitely possible! And Yeltsin in their concessions went much further than Gorbachev, and did so consciously, deliberately weakening the geopolitical power of Russia.
— Why?
— Based on a strategic Alliance with USA, that they will grant Russia the status of the second powers of the world and that he will be admitted to the elite club of world leaders. You have to understand that Yeltsin had his ambitions, and he had a strong character, otherwise he would not have become the leader of the state. Therefore, in this club he wanted to enter on equal terms, as one of the main arbiters of humanity. But he failed to do so, because, as a guide line for the voluntary submission of the West, Yeltsin was not seen by Western leaders as an equal partner. Due to financial and economic weakness of Russia, he was utterly dependent on them.
In 1996, when Yeltsin, having a minimum level of support in Russia, decided to run for a second term, he is counting on the support of the West in this election. Of course, real equality in the situation of the 90s was unattainable. But to meet all the requirements and wishes of the West, too, was not necessary.
— To strive for equality and at the same time, to take the position: one was combined with another?
— Yeltsin was often a victim of its own myth-making. His advisors typeKozyrev and Burbulis him actively helped. For example, tossed the idea that the CIS would be like the European Union that it will be the same degree of unity and that all the republics, except the Baltic States, will inevitably focus on Moscow. They then came up with a formula that is still amazing me with their idiotic “where are they gonna go?”. And Boris Nikolaevich this formula gladly accepted, because it was easy, simple and soothing.
“Where they gonna go?” And not have to do anything. Where are they gonna go? Look at Ukraine, look at Moldova, look at Georgia, look at the Uzbekistan — look what happened to them. If nothing is done to preserve the intimacy with historically close to us States, then these States will come to power new elite. And they will go where they are fed and where they offer something.
Another myth, in captivity of which there was Yeltsin, was the fact that “the United States we are no longer an enemy but a partner.” This is absolutely untrue. United States, since the middle of last century, steadily promote the doctrine of its global dominance. But Yeltsin apparently consoled himself with the fact that it would be possible to somehow change, and that to Russia it will not be treated, it will still be considered. And it was a huge disappointment the decision to expand NATO to the East. This was the reason for the exile Kozyrev.
— What exactly Yeltsin put him?
Is that Kozyrev failed to change for good, friendly relations that were believed to Yeltsin, he had with Clinton and other Western leaders, that they abandoned the idea of NATO enlargement, or at least restricted this extension. If my memory serves me, the turning point in the relationship to Yeltsin, Kozyrev has occurred on the expanded Board of the foreign Ministry on 14 March 1995, with the participation of the President. And then Yeltsin actually disavowed the line Kozyrev, which, in essence, agreed with the NATO. Yeltsin himself a little that could oppose. It is one thing not to be able to face, and it’s another thing to actually agree to this extension, as did Kozyrev in Washington.
After this Board, I remember, all said Kozyrev as Minister ended. Yeltsin was not even looking in his direction. He was extremely displeased with them. And notice that he has appointed instead of Kozyrev — Yevgeny Primakov. Representative of hard-line, a man known for the fact that it will protect the national interests of Russia even with the limited resources that were the country.
— Is it possible in this connection to say that was two different stages in the foreign policy of Yeltsin: Yeltsin and Kozyrev and Yeltsin and Primakov?
— Joining foreign Minister Primakov, of course, marked a new stage. First of all, it was the beginning of the end of voluntary dependence on the West.
If Kozyrev had two ideas. First of all, he loved to refer to the experience of Germany and Japan, saying that we should not be against the United States, and together with them. And, secondly, Kozyrev said that “do not urinate against the wind”. From all this it followed that we must adhere to the Pro-American line in everything. However, if you urinate against the wind and do not, it is possible to go against the wind is necessary if it is blowing in your direction. Kozyrev had forgotten about one very important thing: unlike Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union has not lost a “hot” war and did not sign the surrender. Yes, our country changed its political system and abandon the “cold war”. But the capitulation was not.
Russian citizens, including broad segments of the national elite, were ready for a new relationship with the U.S. to forgo excessive arms race, excessive military spending and the military-political confrontation. But they were not ready to surrender. In addition to the 1995-96 years, it became clear that this capitulatory policy does not hold water.
Remember the Kozyrev complained that we refused to sell weapons to Libya and other “rogue States”, and we are supposedly not allowed on the weapons markets of the West. In 1992, he acknowledged: “They wanted us to leave with our oldest markets and we went in a spirit of partnership and Alliance, and they have their markets are not allowed”. It was obvious that the result of “Kozyrev’s surrender” were not remnants of the cold war and the peer entry of Russia into the Western community, but rather the strengthening of the structures of the cold war in NATO, including the Alliance’s new member States and its promotion to the borders of Russia.
I believe that the expansion of NATO to the East has prompted Moscow to clot capitulatory period in foreign policy. In fact, the appointment of Primakov in the Ministry of foreign Affairs and was a response to this actual surrender. He began to build a foreign policy Russia in the conditions of shortage of financial resources, dependence on the IMF, the pre-default state of Russia and, simultaneously, the absolute necessity for us to participate in the global economy, because without that to talk about economic development would be difficult. At the same time he had to work in conditions, when President Yeltsin, in a hurry to negotiate with the West, demanded more concessions where it could not be.
However, Primakov is primarily because Yeltsin trusted him and considered him — enjoyed a degree of freedom. And he managed to lay the Foundation for Russia’s return to an independent role in world Affairs. And when we have economic and financial resources, Vladimir Putin has implemented this strategy in life.
— How did it happen that instead of political heavyweights like Andrei Gromyko, the foreign Ministry came people like Eduard Shevardnadze and Andrei Kozyrev, did not have neither the necessary experience nor knowledge to hold these posts?And Gorbachev with Yeltsin, if you look, was absolutely not ready for those responsibilities which fell upon them…
— In my opinion, this was the result of the degradation of the Soviet elite. The second half of the 1970s — beginning of 1980s were the era of gerontocracy: people were appointed to new posts at 70-75 years, and this, of course, deprived the system dynamic. Frankly the older heads worked only to maintain the system that brought them up, but not on its development. They were unable to respond to growing challenges. And when he started rejuvenation system, it started to happen not systematically, and convulsive.
So the basis of the personnel crisis, I think, was the failure of the old in the literal sense of the word the state and party elite to reproduce itself in the face of the younger generation.
And this despite the fact that Gorbachev, as it is believed, to the pinnacles of power were promoting the wise and sagacious Yuri Andropov…
— In my opinion, the choice of Gorbachev as leader of the country was a convulsion. In the absence of a sufficient number of young, strong frame, it was decided, then seemed the only correct one. They say that this decision was Andropov. Andropov was not a stupid man, but he, too, could be wrong. He apparently believed that Gorbachev will act in the logic of the Soviet system, but will bring new elements. And Gorbachev acted beyond logic and in spite of any system — on the principle of “let’s denounce the old world, let’s shake its dust from our feet”. So he dusted off…
Yeltsin is another option. In principle, it is from the category of adventurers. And therefore his career should have ended much earlier. In this sense, the decision to enter it in the number of candidate members of the Politburo, given his well-known human qualities, was a mistake. Already then it was clear that Yeltsin’s impulsive, ill-conceived gravitating towards radical solutions and characterized by high conflict.
Another major mistake that Gorbachev made when after the scandalous resignation of Yeltsin in 1987 left him in Moscow on the post of Minister. In the USSR it was customary in such cases to send a man either to retire or to lead to the periphery. If Yeltsin in 1987 went to work as the first Secretary of, say, the Omsk regional Committee of the party or where ever the Ambassador, I think that his career would have ended. And he was given the position of Minister of state — first Vice-President of Gosstroy of the USSR, has left in Moscow, where he was soon able to become the center of unification of all opposition forces. This was another gross miscalculation of Gorbachev, to whom, apparently, it seemed that everything was under control…
— What, in your opinion, the lessons to be learned from the foreign policy failures of Gorbachev and Yeltsin?
— First, in the present circumstances to return to illusions about the possibility of a genuine, meaningful partnership with the USA. With the US partnership can only be situational. United States as a truly global power, by definition, selfish and arrogant. They used to rule, and they do not consider it necessary to take into account the interests of other countries to a greater extent than is strictly necessary for them. And, then, once the need is no longer in partnership, they stop you, in fact — will try to cause you problems and get you at any turn.
However, I think the lesson we’ve already learned and from illusions about the USA certainly got rid of. Another lesson: in order to claim autonomy in world politics and to an effective defense of their interests, the degree of dependence on external players should be minimal. Today, there are three States that are able to take a fully independent foreign policy decisions. This is the United States, China and Russia. We with great difficulty reached the level when you can afford such independence. But if we want to be an independent state, we must rely on a solid economy.
After all, if the economy is so dependent on foreign centers of lending and funding like ours, any conflict situation can undermine its stable development and, therefore, the basis for an independent foreign policy. Moreover, this dialectical and dynamic process: it cannot be assumed that if a country has reached this state, it is preserved forever. No. Economic base independence in foreign Affairs must be constantly maintained and strengthened.
— The Soviet Union in its best years, in fact, engaged…
— Yes, but due to the inability to establish an effective economy has lost hard-won international position. So this is a very serious challenge. This is the challenge that we have to constantly respond.
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Journal “the Historian”, April 2016
