American retired major General Robert scales, known in our country thanks to the call to kill as many Russians as possible, gave an interview to veteran resource Task&Purpose about the situation in the army and, in particular, shared his vision of problems of the infantry. Translation published for the Community of military bloggers
Robert scales, major General, retired, speaks about what happens when the needs of the infantry in the first place
Since the Second world war the majority of American deaths in combat account for infantry. These brothers, and now sisters in arms make up a small part of the armed forces, but bear the brunt of the fighting and death.
This is the warriors of the nation. Their work requires daily to leave the location in order to find the enemy, get close to him and kill him. They are fighting up close, at the unit level. Such collisions should be asymmetric, with a large margin in favor of American infantry and special forces. Unfortunately, it is not.
In his forthcoming book “the scales of the war: the future of the armed forces of America under threat,” army major General retired Robert H. scales Jr. argues that if us ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, more high-quality weapons, equipment and support, are not required to performed by them in battles, outstanding deeds, and the losses could be much lower.
For 35 years of service, he led two units in the Vietnam war as a field artillery officer and received the Silver star for actions in the battle for the height of “Hamburger”. Was in a managerial position on the other side of the globe from the us, South Korea, and finished his career as the commandant of the war College of the U.S. Army, resigned in 2001. After retiring from the army 14 years as senior military analyst for Fox News and a commentator on NPR and the BBC, has written countless articles and many books about the history and future American wars.
Skales spoke with Task&Purpose about the priority large-scale programs on small, focused on a combination of support tools for ground troops on fight Islamic state in Iraq and Syria and on the situation in the army.
What is the strength of our military? In technology? What should be the strength?
I think the greatest strength of our military is not technology. I think it is two things. The first is the quality of the people: if you look at the armies of the world and try to find one that is comparable today with our, you will not find. Second, I think culture. In our armed forces culture of decentralized leadership that other armies do not play. Often we have sergeants doing what in other armies colonels. Such an army is more viable, more reliable, more flexible.
Your book, “scales of war” begins with a discussion of “unnecessary characters” and needs to “unfair fights”. Can deploy?
I have always been convinced that the vulnerable heart of the sustainability America — dead Americans, and our enemies have long been employ a strategy based on the murder of Americans and rely on it. Even without the humanitarian aspect I have always maintained that the success of countries at the strategic level, especially in long wars, connected with the conduct of the fighting with the least cost to human life, and most of the deaths and 81%, four out of five deaths in the war — the Second world war happened in the infantry. And my position has always been that if the enemy is trying to win by killing our ground fighters, that is infantry, we should not allow the infantry to melee in a fair fight. Bad to make, bad ever really happens, but based on strategic alignment, strategic need, changes everything.
So if the goal of the enemy — dead Americans, and if the majority of combat deaths in the infantry, why do we assume, and too often to fights at the unit level turned out to be honest? I don’t see any logic in this, and therefore wrote this book.
Looks like perfect fair game for ground forces of the United States?
The technology of miniaturization, the Internet, the development of means to combat units already sitting on the edge of the technological revolution, it is only necessary to spend the money.
First, most importantly, drones. Secondly, the use of ground robots or UAVs. Thirdly, communications soldiers, and fourthly, the new complex portable weapons that can destroy tanks, bring down planes and shooting bad guys is far beyond the reach of their weapons.
Again, this is not a fighter where the main concern is stealth as, at least, they say. This combination means that ensure domination. The whole difficulty for the army and marine corps that each of those points falls on individual authorities. By the time you get through them all, there is no person responsible specifically for the promotion of the rule at the business unit level. Something fairly similar, in my opinion, is in ucno (Joint special operations command). At ucno happened, and because ucno so effectively — literally everything under one roof.
If we want the next President has reached a decisive advantage in the wars that we’re actually going to — but not those that the Navy wants to do with China — that’s what you should spend money, and growth opportunities for each invested dollar will be prohibitive, in contrast, I don’t know of another carrier.
Why better armor, small arms, life-saving technologies, monitoring tools, which is very important for ground troops, fighters, special forces, etc. — not more emphasis?
I just stand up and say to the audience: “graduate of the naval Academy runs from six months to two years of flight school, is allowed to F-18. Then trained on the aircraft carrier; then becoming a qualified pilot and flies on a car worth 75 million dollars. Is it life for parents is more valuable than the life of eighteen year old boys with secondary education, having just received a bullet between the eyes, because the enemy has better weapons?”
And I said, “remember the life of a Lieutenant more than life lance corporal?” And look at you and say, “of Course not”. And then I ask: “Then why do you spend 4 million dollars on this guy when his down, announce to the whole country and gather journalists from around the world to capture his experiences, and when eighteen-year-old shoot between the eyes, it’s just running line in the news?”
Our society values the life of a Lieutenant more than the life of lance corporal, and it’s wrong. It is wrong. I believe that the money should go where the greatest probability of death, we do the opposite.
In July last year you wrote an article in the Washington Post about the state of the army. You said that the army breaks. Can deploy? If she breaks down so far?
When our army is broken, at least in this century — and in my memory this has happened five times already — it breaks down to Sergeant level. The army is broken when sergeants are voting with their feet, or injured, or dead. Army, characterized by decentralized leadership, it is both good and bad. Bad that to replace the broken it is impossible, because the fragile balance of leadership and responsibility in the army it is necessary to carefully shape for a long time.
The role of alarm bell in our army sergeants play. The army breaks down not because a computer operator at the Pentagon were having a bad day. She breaks down at the unit level. Broken when excessive liabilities and losses afflict those who are doing the dirty work — fight and die — and they break. When they break down, then crashing the rest of the army.
You tell me that we will have a 15-year war forces less than a half-million army, I would have called you a liar. The fact of maintaining an army-level training in itself is a miracle, but the army is broken that way. Break in; break down from the bottom up, being broken, cannot be restored more than a dozen years.
Paratrooper of the US army 1st brigade combat team, 82nd airborne division firing the M4 carbine at insurgents during a firefight June 30, 2012, Ghazni province, Afghanistan
Shot Sergeant Michael J. Macleod U.S. army
Are there any issues specific to the all-volunteer army? What are they?
I don’t think this is the problem. The only problems is, first, the insensitivity and indifference to the soldiers melee, the speakers at the spearhead of the volunteer forces. The threat of an all-volunteer army that will end or knackered ones who kill, but it is not a systemic flaw. It’s a question of priorities and relationships. In the wars of our age have professional armies are no cons.
Want to ensure the survivability of the army, provide survivability in the melee units; paranatisite their privates and sergeants. Calculate how much you need and double.
What we always end up in the first place? End ships? No. Out of planes? No. Over the satellites? No. Run out of missiles? No. End 11B (military specialty code, means the shooter-grunt — approx. TRANS.). Always. And this lack of melee soldiers sets strategy instead of strategy asked a number of melee soldiers.
How would you describe the current fight against ISIS? We are at war with ISIS? What it would take to war with ISIS, and whether our armed forces with these requirements?
Ever heard the old saying — everyone knows the sound of cotton two hands, but the sound of the cotton with one hand?
That is the question. We listen to cotton with one hand, when, in fact, part of the state has declared war on the West, and the Holy Grail war with the West not France or the United Kingdom, and the United States. You have one side declares and wages war and the other trying to get away from the problem, but this is war. People are dying. There is another old adage that America is brilliant at leading short war bad long, so that in itself delay the entire venture, hoping to wait out the political situation only increases suffering and in the end causes more damage to our side, because we are very poor conduct of the long war.
If you’re not going to fight, do not fight. If you are going to apply overwhelming force, break the enemy ridge and back home.
How do you feel about the idea of sending ground troops in connection with the civil war in Syria and the US policy against ISIS?
She’s just crazy. Primarily need ground troops. Don’t know what is the reason for their absence, but the gods of war, no matter how cool, crafty, and political action and maneuvers can only partly control the processes defining the course of the war. In other words, under the leadership of Roosevelt’s America perfectly shied away from the European war before pearl Harbor, and we all ignored the terrorist threat before 9/11 and I could go on forever. At some point, the war already directs the Darwinian process that nobody can ask or send. There comes the psychological tipping point, after which the tide of war set of circumstances, not political desires.
The enemy, ultimately, is the voice. If the enemy decides to go in on the ground — because there is benefit it will be in effect.
